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I
INTRODUCTION
We expect our elected officials to be good talkers. In fact, people often
associate famous political figures with their gift for speech-making. Abraham
Lincoln, William Jennings Bryan, Winston Churchill, and Franklin Roosevelt
come to mind. Members of the House and Senate often seek to emulate such
speakers, no doubt dreaming of higher office. There are also times when a
rousing speech is needed to rally others to an important cause. Therefore, a
certain amount of public oratory can be useful, and when not useful, is at least
harmless.
The true work of government, however, is in the creation and modification
of institutions for achieving the ends of government. In order to do that work
a legislator must exercise sound judgment; the oratorical flourish is of little
value. It is unlikely that legislators have ever solved important problems by
deduction from political epigrams. What is needed instead is a sense of right
ends, and an understanding of how to achieve those ends.
It is impractical, however, to expect our elected officials to know enough,
when elected, to answer all of the questions they must answer in the course of
their work. Legislators must learn on the job. They must supplement their
instincts and knowledge by relying on congressional mechanisms for
marshalling the expertise of others. Therefore, although one might be
elected to Congress with a fully developed talent for speech-making, that
talent is insufficient. Successful legislators must be good listeners as well.
II
KASTENMEIER THE LISTENER
This symposium, in part, recapitulates the legislative accomplishments of
Congressman Kastenmeier, a legacy founded significantly upon his talent as a
listener. That talent was evident in his respect for the legislative process and
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in his ability to elicit the advice of others. While Kastenmeier did not always
follow the opinions of those to whom he listened, before forming his own
opinions he did listen, seriously, to his staff, his constituents, representatives
of groups affected by legislation being considered by his subcommittee, and
to others whose judgment he trusted. Thus, by listening to others,
Kastenmeier generally made sound legislative judgments, and in the process
earned the loyalty of his staff and the respect of those with whom he worked.
There is ample evidence to support the conclusion that Kastenmeier was a
gifted listener in his role as Congressman. Kastenmeier's body language was
that of a person actively listening. By my recollection, he often stood with his
left arm across his body, holding his right elbow, and with his right hand near
his chin. His posture made it clear that he was not merely waiting for you to
finish so that he could take his turn. If anything, his posture suggested that he
was quite comfortable listening, at least for the moment. It invited you to
speak, or to continue if you were already speaking. Most people who dealt
with Kastenmeier share my belief that he not only listened to what they said,
but also that he took their views into account when determining policy (even
though he may have decided against their cause). One begins to wonder how
they could tell. How did Kastenmeier convey that impression so uniformly?
Professor Willard Hurst, who has known Kastenmeier from the beginning of
his political career, answered these questions with his characterization of
Kastenmeier as a "receptor" rather than a "projector"-and contrasted this
with most politicians, who seek to project themselves whatever the setting.'
James Lardner, in his book about the economic, judicial, and legislative
battle over the introduction of the VCR,2 commented on the hearings held by
Kastenmeier concerning the way in which copyright law should treat the new
technology. Lardner's remarks portray Kastenmeier as a master listener:
Although not associated with any cause or bill that had gained national attention,
Kastenmeier's name was linked to a way of conducting congressional business that had
enjoyed some success by example. He operated in the open. He had been one of the
first subcommittee chairmen to invite the press and public to watch a bill being
"marked up." He listened to what witnesses said at hearings, asked them questions that seemed to
be intended to elicit information, and gave every indication of taking the answers into account. His
own views were slow to develop-annoyingly so, to some tastes-and when they did,
he rarely bothered to announce them.
3
Still a third example of the centrality of listening to Kastenmeier's
legislative approach is an article co-authored by Congressman Kastenmeier
and Michael Remington, chief counsel to Kastenmeier's committee.4 The
article presents what Kastenmeier and Remington call a "political test" for
1. Telephone interview with Emeritus Professor Willard Hurst, University of Wisconsin Law
School (Aug 8, 1991).
2. James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, The Japanese, and the VCR Wars (New Am Library,
1987).
3. Id at 248 (emphasis added).
4. Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984:
A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 Minn L Rev 417 (1985). Although it is quite likely that Remington
produced a draft of the article, it is also appropriate to assume that Kastenmeier had "final edit" and
that the article thus summarizes his views.
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intellectual property legislation, a test that is arguably conservative and based
on a principle of receptivity. They begin by quoting Harvard Law Professor
Benjamin Kaplan's view that "wise legislation will not proceed by deduction
from a monistic premise but upon a series of judgments about ends served
and disserved by particular measures." 5 They then argue that a type of "civil
procedure" should be applied to legislative proposals. They suggest four
criteria: the proponent (1) must establish that the proposal is consistent with
the existing legislative framework; (2) must ensure that the proposal is clear;
(3) should offer a candid assessment of both the positive and negative effects
of the change; and (4) must show on the record that the proposal will enrich
or enhance the public interest.
Two points are implicit in this test. First, some party or interest must
promulgate a proposal for the legislature to consider. Second, legislators
need to listen to evidence in order to judge such proposals. Thus this theory
of legislation embodies Kastenmeier's commitment to listening, and not the
notion that legislators themselves are the principal sources of legislation. 6
Lardner was apparently correct when he suggested that Kastenmeier actually
listened at the hearings.
A fourth example is also inferable from a close reading of Kastenmeier's
and Remington's article. One skilled in the modem art of literary
deconstruction could, I believe, show the article to have been written by one
holding the values I have ascribed to Kastenmeier; the content and form of
the article embody the virtues of active listening. The article rarely refers to
Congressman Kastenmeier himself, suggesting that he saw his own role in the
process as that of an evaluator or an observer, rather than an initiator.7 In
places where one might expect a reference to Kastenmeier the legislator, one
finds instead a reference to Congress, the collegial body. The extensive
footnoting reflects the view that the case is made, or unmade, in the facts and
not in the argumentation; the proof is in the evidence, and one convinces
another with evidence, not by deductions from abstract principles. This
respect for proof is the method of a judicious listener. The numerous
references in the text and the footnotes to statements made at congressional
hearings provide further evidence that the authors believed those statements
were critical to the judgments that followed.
5. ld at 439, quoting Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright; Proposals and Prospects, 66
Colum L Rev 831, 854 (1966).
6. For those intrigued by self-referential irony, Kastenmeier and Remington do not claim
themselves to have authored the theory, but frankly ascribe it to Professor David Lange, who offered
it in congressional hearings devoted to a consideration of copyright and technological change.
Kastenmeier & Remington, 70 Minn L Rev at 442 n105 (cited in note 4) (acknowledging Statement
of David Lange, Copyright and Technological Change, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
98th Cong, 1st Sess 23 (1983)). Professor Lange, of course, is one of those responsible for this
symposium.
7. The absence of references to his own role almost certainly displays a measure of modesty,
another Kastenmeier characteristic.
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III
To WHOM DID KASTENMEIER LISTEN?
Having argued that Kastenmeier had confidence in the process by which
Congress gathered evidence and acted upon that evidence, the questions
remain to whom did Kastenmeier listen, and how did that advice influence
him? It is certainly not the case that good listeners listen indiscriminately. A
comprehensive survey of Kastenmeier's sources of information is clearly
beyond the scope of this short comment. Such a task might include
interviewing Kastenmeier and his staff to determine who testified frequently at
hearings over which he presided, and examining the footnotes of articles and
speeches to see which names recur." One also would have to include the
names of those who served, at one time or another, on Kastenmeier's own
congressional staff or who worked for a related committee, including Michael
Remington, David Beier, Bruce Lehman, Tim Boggs, and Charles O'Shiki. I
will eschew such an effort and discuss just one name.
At least one person with whom Kastenmeier frequently discussed
intellectual property issues was Professor John Stedman of the University of
Wisconsin Law School. It seems clear that Stedman influenced Kastenmeier's
views on intellectual property issues. It may be asked why Kastenmeier valued
Stedman's contribution and exactly what substantive values Stedman
conveyed to Kastenmeier. A short tribute written by Kastenmeier on the
occasion of Stedman's death in 1984 suggests an answer:
I knewJohn Stedman for more than thirty years: first as my law teacher and second
as a fellow lawyer. During that time, John became a cherished and dear personal
friend. I grew to know and respect him not only as a legal scholar, but also as a trusted
confidant.... I would be hard pressed to list the countless times that I sought his
professional and personal advice. John testified on numerous occasions, he
corresponded regularly, he was always available on the telephone, and when in
Washington, D.C., he usually stopped by my office.
John ... was more than just a legal advisor to be asked a question about a judicial
decision or a proposed legislative reform. He was a fresh and independent thinker, a
trait particularly unusual in a world of special interests and pressure to conform. 9
In addition, conversations with Kastenmeier and his staff convince me that
Kastenmeier valued Stedman's intelligence and independence equally.' 0 The
combination of these traits, along with Stedman's familiarity with the
legislative process, made him, in Kastenmeier's words, "a unique resource.""l
8. Professors Lange and Patterson, Judge Abner Mikva, and Registers of Copyright Ralph
Oman and David Ladd are names that frequently recur, which suggests that Kastenmeier often found
their views particularly helpful.
9. Robert W. Kastenmeier, John Stedman-In Remembrance, 1984 Wis L Rev 578, 578-79.
10. Kastenmeier himself had a well-deserved reputation for independence. He often took
politically risky positions, such as early opposition to the U. S. involvement in the Vietnam war and
skepticism about President Bush's reactions to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
11. Id at 579. Kastenmeier also notes that "John possessed all the skills necessary for a
policymaker. Most importantly, he was always practical and realistic in terms of what was politically
achievable. This skill made him particularly helpful to the legislative process." Id.
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Kastenmeier first encountered Professor Stedman when Kastenmeier was
a student at the University of Wisconsin Law School, where he received his
bachelor of laws degree in 1952. Stedman, a Wisconsin native and 1934
graduate of the law school, joined the faculty in 1935. In 1939 he pursued a
master of laws degree at Columbia University, where he became interested in
patent law, writing a thesis entitled "Licensing of Patents and the Competitive
System." In 1941 Stedman went to Washington, where he spent the next
eight years. After a stint with the Office of Price Administration, he served in
four divisions of the Justice Department: Alien Property, Lands, Claims, and
Antitrust.' 2 While in the Claims Division, Stedman headed the Patent
Section. He then moved to the Antitrust Division and in 1949 became the
chief of the Legislative and Clearance Section.'3 Stedman returned to
teaching at the University of Wisconsin Law School in 1950, just in time to
encounter Robert Kastenmeier as his student. Therefore, when Kastenmeier
was his student, Stedman had a significant amount of Washington experience
and was intimately familiar with the legislative process from the viewpoint of
the Justice Department.
What were Stedman's views on intellectual property at the time? What
substantive perspective did he bring to his relationship with Kastenmeier,
then and in the years that followed? By 1950, Stedman had testified about
patent law or antitrust policy eleven times before congressional committees.' 4
He had also written a 175-page master's thesis on patent licensing and
competition' 5 and published seven law review articles, four of which dealt
with patent and antitrust issues. 16 The views he expressed in his written work
and in his testimony were undoubtedly conveyed to his students in and out of
the classroom. Interestingly, Stedman's first major law review article,
Invention and Public Policy, appeared in 1947 as part of a symposium on the
patent system published by the journal in which this comment appears.' 7 The
article constitutes a thoughtful and concise summary of Stedman's analysis of
the strengths and weaknesses of the patent system and is entirely consistent
with the views he held on those issues for the rest of his scholarly career. The
article begins with a lively call to be open-minded about the patent system:
12. See Wilbur L. Fugate, John Stedman's Government Career, 1976 Wis L Rev 12.
13. Id.
14. See Nancy Paul &John A. Kidwell,John Stedman-His Bibliography, 1984 Wis L Rev 581, 586-
87.
15. Although it cannot be determined exactly when the work was done, upon Stedman's death
his unpublished papers included a 569-page manuscript entitled "Patent Agreements and the
Competitive System. The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws: the
Situation in the Past, Present Trends, and Future Possibilities." This was an elaboration on the
Columbia master's thesis, and it is likely that it was done early in Stedman's career. Both the
master's thesis and the elaboration on it are in the Faculty Archive Collection at the University of
Wisconsin Law School.
16. For a list of the articles, see Paul & Kidwell, 1984 Wis L Rev at 581 (cited in note 14).
Stedman had also published seven book reviews, including reviews of books on drafting patent
claims and on competition in the public utility industry. Id.
17. John C. Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 L & Contemp Probs 649 (Autumn 1947).
More self-reference!
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Despite an occasional mystic who persists in viewing our patent system as a sacred
cow, not to be touched, much less slaughtered, I take it there is no serious challenge
today of the proposition that the patent system has for its primary purpose the
advancement of the public interest and that it must be evaluated in the light of that
interest-and, if necessary, changed to promote it.
In the many and, at times, acrimonious debates and arguments concerning the
merits of the patent system, the furtherance of the public interest has been a basic
premise. While protagonists and antagonists both, like thunder at dawn, have often
produced much noise but little light, the issues have been clear, if the answers have
not: Does our present system further or retard the public interest? Would proposed
changes make matters better or worse?' 8
Stedman proceeds to argue that, in order to obtain those benefits to the
public interest, the government had made a deal with inventors-a seventeen-
year privilege of excluding others from exploiting the invention in exchange
for public disclosure of the invention.19 The issue is whether both sides have
substantially performed their sides of the bargain, and whether the price is an
appropriate one. After recapitulating how the patent system might have been
failing to accomplish its avowed objectives, Stedman concludes that
[t]he extent to which our patent system operates for good or evil in our present
economy and the extent, if any, to which it should be modified to accomplish the
greatest good, and the ways in which it can be adapted to carry out the constitutional
purpose and still accommodate itself to the broader and overriding concept of a free
competitive enterprise, are matters which cannot be determined by futile references to
the past or broad generalities. They can only be determined by hard grubbing into
the facts.
20
Stedman then poses a series of factual questions that he believes should be
answered before undertaking any modification of the patent system.2 1
I have quoted the above passages for three reasons. First, they exemplify
Stedman's perspective. His touchstone was the public interest, and he sought
factual justification for the features of the patent system. He believed that the
patent system was an appropriate, though imperfect, mechanism for achieving
desired ends, but he was insistent that we realize the price we paid for the
benefits received, and that we remain constantly ready to re-evaluate the
balance of cost and benefit. He believed that it was too easy to slip from a
"public benefit" rationale to a "natural right" justification, and equally easy to
underestimate the anti-competitive consequences of extensions of lawful
monopoly. Stedman's sensitivity to the functional effect of the patent system
in a competitive economy matured during his time with the Justice
Department and deepened over the period of his scholarly career. 22
Stedman's conversations with Kastenmeier may have also tempered the
perspective of others familiar enough to offer advice about copyright and
18. Id at 649.
19. Id at 656.
20. Id at 678.
21. Id at 679.
22. The reconciliation of antitrust law and principles with a healthy and effective patent system
were issues that occupied Stedman for much of his career. For a brief recapitulation of this
scholarship, see John A. Kidwell,John Stedman's Scholarship, 1976 Wis L Rev 1; Paul & Kidwell, 1984
Wis L Rev at 581 (cited in note 14).
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patent law, who may have emphasized the virtues of strengthening and
expanding the nature of proprietary interests while downplaying the costs to
competition. Stedman never questioned the value of patents and copyrights
but had a sense of the limits beyond which stronger proprietary interests
began to retard rather than advance the public interest. 23
Next, note the echo of Stedman's 1947 call for grubbing for answers in the
hard facts rather than deduction from broad generalities in Kaplan's
reminder 24 that wise legislation would not proceed by "deduction from a
monistic premise." Stedman, like Kastenmeier, had an abiding respect for the
evaluation of evidence as a source of enlightenment, rather than reliance on
deduction from general statements of principle. Stedman showed a social
scientist's respect for data, and a healthy suspicion of the time-honored truths
that often turn out to be mere folklore.
Finally, and equally relevant to the purpose of this comment, Kastenmeier
quoted the passage above which begins "[d]espite an occasional mystic" as
exemplifying Stedman's attitude toward both the patent and copyright
systems. 25 He apparently believed, as I do, that the passage captured both
Stedman's insistence on the public interest as a touchstone for intellectual
property law and his healthy skepticism about the extent to which the system
was achieving that end. By choosing the passage as exemplifying the view of
one whom he admired, and by asking "Stedman's questions"2 6 of witnesses at
23. Although Stedman had, during the early and middle parts of his career, devoted most of his
energy to the patent system, he later brought to copyright issues the same critical eye. As chairman
of the American Association of University Professors Copyright Revision Committee, consultant to
the National Science Foundation, and advisor to the American Library Association, Stedman was a
central figure in the development of the positions taken by librarians and educators in the debates
over copyright revision in the early 1970s.
The American Library Association, the Association of Research Libraries, and the American
Association of University Professors, among others, often called on him in his later years to
brainstorm on the legal intricacies of the copyright law, and it is John Stedman's
philosophies more than anyone else's which form the basis of the national library and higher
education communities' positions on fair use and library photocopying.
Nancy H. Marshall, John Stedman-Activist Retiree, 1984 Wis L Rev 572. The American Library
Association dedicated its June 1983 session on copyright law to Professor Stedman. His
bibliography discloses that he testified before Congress three times on copyright issues, published
four articles, and wrote at least three articles or speeches that remained unpublished but that focus
on copyright law issues. Paul & Kidwell, 1984 Wis L Rev 582-90 (cited in note 14).
24. Stedman, 12 L & Contemp Probs at 649 (cited in note 17); Kaplan, 66 Colum L Rev at 854
(cited in note 5), quoted in Kastenmeier & Remington, 70 Minn L Rev at 439 (cited in note 4).
25. Kastenmeier, 1984 Wis L Rev at 579 (cited in note 9). Kastenmeier quoted the same words
in Stedman's memory at a hearing before Kastenmeier's subcommittee. In addition to dedicating the
hearing to Stedman, Kastenmeier "put to each and every witness the two questions Stedman would
have asked: 'Does our present system further or retard the public interest?' and 'Would proposed
changes make matters better or worse?' " See Innovation and Patent Law Reform, Hearings on HR
3285, 3286 & 3605 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice of the House Committee on theJudiciary, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 1 (1984) (opening statement of
Subcommittee Chairman Kastenmeier)("Innovation Hearings"). The use of those questions, and his
sense that their use would be both a fitting tribute to Stedman and an implementation of his role as
chair, strongly suggest Kastenmeier's belief that the reconciliation of each change in the law with the
public interest was heart and soul of the subcommittee's task.
26. Innovation Hearings at 1-2 (cited in note 25).
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a hearing dedicated to Stedman, Kastenmeier also must be seen as endorsing
it himself.
Although empirical analysis of Kastenmeier's legislative work to prove he
held and implemented such a view is beyond the scope of this short comment,
I believe Kastenmeier did share Stedman's concerns, and Kastenmeier's
leadership of the House subcommittee reflected great sympathy for
Stedman's approach. Some might object that the quotations I have presented
are insufficient to demonstrate any functionally significant opinions because
they would be subscribed to universally. I disagree. Although it is true that
few would subscribe to the converse of the quoted statement-that the
purpose of patent law is to benefit the patentees, which may produce
incidental benefits to the public-it is significant to begin an article with an
expression of skeptical support for a flawed system rather than with a more
enthusiastic endorsement of the patent system as the engine of innovation.
Listing one value first among many indicates its priority. The quotations are
also significant because they reflect Stedman's and Kastenmeier's view that
each and every marginal adjustment to the regime of intellectual property
must be justified in terms of its consonance with first principles; it is all too
easy to consider "technical" changes in their local context only and not in
light of whether they forward the statutory purpose of the entire structure of
the law.
The ultimate test of Stedman's influence would be to attempt to find
specific instances in which Stedman's testimony led to changes in
Kastenmeier's positions on specific pieces of legislation. This comment offers
no such proof. The task would require more time and pages than are
available and is probably impracticable in any event. Stedman's advice was
often embodied in conversation, of which no record remains, or in
correspondence that has not survived or that would be extremely difficult to
find in legislative files. Even the testimony, which is more easily available, is
difficult to match with specific outcomes. Stedman sometimes testified before
the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee (which he served as associate counsel even
after he returned to teaching2 7). Though it is likely Stedman provided
Kastenmeier with a copy of his remarks, the House version of the bill might
have been sufficiently different from the Senate bill to reduce Kastenmeier's
ability to profit from Stedman's analyses. In addition, bills on which Stedman
testified were often extensively amended before they emerged as legislation,
and many, of course, did not emerge at all. 28 Finally, Stedman was often
27. After returning to the University of Wisconsin Law School, Stedman continued to serve as
special counsel or consultant to congressional committees. He was associate counsel to the
Subcommittee on Patents of the Senate Judiciary Committee, for example, and between 1956 and
1963 served as the editor of a series of 30 patent studies for the Subcommittee.
28. I cannot resist noting here that some legislators' most important moments come not in
sponsoring legislation, but in defeating legislation sponsored by others. It would be interesting to
evaluate Kastenmeier's legislative legacy in terms of the wrong-headed or hastily prepared bills that
died, quietly and appropriately, in committee, or in terms of proposals that, as the result of study by
subcommittee and staff, were never even embodied in draft legislation.
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joined in his opinions by others; his independent influence is therefore
impossible to measure in all cases.29
IV
CONCLUSION
I had the privilege to vote for Bob Kastenmeier for Congress ten times. I
admired his independence. My own interest in intellectual property led me to
appreciate his dedication to a legislative method that gave appropriate
attention to the principles underlying intellectual property law and due
recognition to the delicate balance between long- and short-term competitive
costs and benefits. I had the privilege of working withJohn Stedman for more
than ten years. He shared Kastenmeier's taste for independence. Although I
certainly do not want to exaggerate Stedman's role in Kastenmeier's thinking
on patent and copyright issues, I think he was influential and that his influence
reinforced Kastenmeier's inclination to extend proprietary protection
reluctantly, and only when it could be shown that such an extension served
the broader public interest.
29. Kastenmeier and Stedman did not always agree. Stedman, for example, testified against a
proposal for the creation of a Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC"). Industrial
Innovation and Patent and Copyright Law Amendments, Hearings on HR 6033, 6933, 3806 & 2414,
before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 180-85 (1980). He was not convinced of the severity
of the problems the new court was designed to solve or that the new court would in fact solve those
problems. He also worried that the new court would be captured by the "technical expertise" of the
patent bar and lack what he termed "general expertise." (Stedman testified that he was "concerned
that there would be a tendency on the part of the judges themselves [on the new CAFC] to emphasize
the technical specialized aspects of the cases before them to the possible de-emphasis of the
important public considerations that may be involved." Id at 183.) He believed that the lack of
uniformity between venues was a problem that arose primarily at the trial court level and the CAFC
was unlikely to increase significantly the uniformity of standards and decisions. A review of
Stedman's testimony and Kastenmeier's comments about the creation of the CAFC, however,
suggests that although they ultimately disagreed about the wisdom of the proposal, they asked the
same questions in reaching their respective judgments. Kastenmeier seemed simply to give more
weight to the argument for uniformity and to the advantages to judicial administration of the new
court. See, for example, Kastenmeier's remarks at the Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 94 FRD 350, 358-59 (1982), as well as his
remarks upon the introduction of HR 3806. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Act of 1980,
HR 3806, 96th Cong, 2d Sess (1980), reprinted in 126 Cong Rec H25364 (Sept 15, 1980) (remarks
of Rep. Kastenmeier).
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